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1. INTRODUCTION 
The last few decades have witnessed a continuous growth of the so-called 
transnational corporations, which engage in production and/or trade be- 
yond the boundaries of their home country. Some of these corporations 
have begun operating in Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, 
and the People’s Republic of China under a system of joint ventures, which 
we define, following Tomlinson (1970), as a “commitment, for more than 
a very short duration, of funds, facilities, and services by two or more 
legally separate interests, to an enterprise for their mutual benefit.” 
In a recent article in this Journal, Josef Brada (1977a) provided a pio- 
neering theoretical treatment of the systems of joint ventures between 
Western firms and national enterprises in Hungary, Romania, and Yu- 
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goslavia. He sought to show that the profit-maximizing objectives of West- 
ern firms and the objectives of their domestic partners in joint ventures 
differed and, as a result, that disagreements over the pricing of inputs and 
their levels of utilization would occur in joint-venture negotiations. A part 
of the divergence in objectives stems, according to Brada, from the fact 
that the socialist partner benefits both from its share of the accounting 
profits (total revenues minus total costs) of the joint venture and from the 
sale of inputs to the joint venture at transfer prices above cost. In the 
negotiation on the operation of the venture the domestic partner thus has 
an incentive to seek overutilization of those of its resources which are sold 
to the joint venture at above-cost transfer prices. 
Brada (1977a) does not explain how this conflict between the partners 
is resolved. In fact, Brada’s results stem entirely from an analysis in which 
each partner’s criteria for resource allocation are considered separately, 
rather than in a framework of strategic interaction. This leads to serious 
shortcomings which we point out in Section 2.2 
The main aim of this paper is to explain, by means of game theory, how 
the conflicts between the partners are resolved in terms of resource allo- 
cation and income distribution. We start our analysis by recognizing that 
the partners who jointly form the venture also jointly determine the policies 
for factor allocation and income distribution. From a bargaining point of 
view, all partners are therefore interested in the utility they can derive 
from the venture and in allocating resources so as to maximize their goals. 
We generalize Brada’s framework by assuming that the Western partner 
may also benefit from selling some inputs to the joint venture above cost. 
This is consistent with much of the literature on transnational corporations. 
In analyzing the various systems of joint ventures we use Svejnar’s (1977, 
1982) generalization of the Nash (1950) model to account for the bar- 
gaining power of the partners. The model presumes that, if the partners 
are free to bargain, they jointly select a solution that is Pareto-efficient 
from their perspective and distributes the net income in proportion to their 
bargaining powers. In analyzing the general framework and applying it to 
the institutional settings of the several centrally planned and labor-man- 
aged economies, we concentrate on the prototypical models of “Romania,” 
“Hungary,” and “Yugoslavia.” As can be seen from Table 1, the insti- 
tutional systems in the other countries represent combinations or only minor 
modifications of these three models. Our analysis shows that: 
s Brada employs an analogous strategy and obtains similar results in a companion (1977b) 
paper. However, in the latter part of that paper he suggests that a game-theoretic approach 
to the analysis of input allocation in the joint venture may be more appropriate. Outlining 
the Nash (1950) two-party bargaining model and the Harsanyi-Selten generalization of the 
Nash model, Brada claims (but does not prove) that joint ventures can in fact be expected 
to utilize all inputs Pareto-efficiently. 
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(i) The factor allocation of the joint venture may, but need not, be 
socially optimal (in the Pareto sense) from the host country’s point of view. 
(ii) The achievement of this social allocational optimality depends on 
the objective functions of the partners, but not in Brada’s sense. Rather, 
socially inefficient resource allocation may emerge in certain types of labor- 
managed systems because of the objective function of the domestic partner. 
(iii) If the joint venture generates a socially inefficient factor allo- 
cation, then its extent is directly related to the relative bargaining power 
of the partners and to the net profit of the venture. 
(iv) Even if the host government determines unilaterally the distri- 
bution of accounting profits, the partners still divide actual profits in pro- 
portion to their true bargaining powers so long as at least one input (trans- 
fer) price is subject to bargaining. 
(v) With the possible exception of Yugoslavia and perhaps China, a 
tendency to view Western experiences in these countries within a common 
framework is not as erroneous as Brada (1977a) suggested. In particular, 
there is no reason to distinguish between the “Romanian” and “Hungarian” 
type models in terms of criteria for factor allocation and income distri- 
bution. 
2. MODELS OF JOINT VENTURES 
In this section we first discuss Brada’s results and point out certain 
problems associated with his conclusions about the patterns of input uti- 
lization sought by each of the partners. In doing so we utilize a more 
general analytical framework than was used by Brada (1977a). In the 
second part of this section we outline a bargaining model that appears to 
be more appropriate for analyzing the allocational and distributional prob- 
lems of the joint ventures. In Section 3 we apply the model to the insti- 
tutional frameworks of Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and compare 
our results with those of Brada. 
Following Brada’s (1977a) notation, consider a general model in which 
the joint venture located in a host country produces one output, Q, with 
the aid of IYI inputs provided by the Western partner, X = (X,, . . . , X,), 
n nonlabor inputs purchased domestically, Y = (Y,, . . . , Y,), and the labor 
input, L, which is also hired in the host country? 
Q = Q(X,, . . . , X,, . , . , X,,,, Y,, . . . , Yr, . . . , Y,,, L). (1) 
The production function in ( 1) is assumed to be strictly concave in the 
relevant range. The output is sold at a fixed price, P, (the model is readily 
generalizable to imperfect competition) and inputs X and Y are acquired 
‘The model can be generalized to account for a multiproduct firm without affecting the 
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154 SVEJNAR AND SMITH 
by the respective partners at constant per unit costs Ci (i = 1, . . . , k, 
. . . ) m) and CT (j = 1, . . . , 1, . . . , n). We also assume that each party 
may exercise a certain discretion over the prices at which it supplies some 
of its inputs to the joint venture. Brada (1977a) argued that the Western 
partner’s ability to benefit from sales to the joint venture is sharply limited, 
since Western inputs “must, by virtue of the location of the joint venture, 
be tradeables and thus their prices can be ascertained from world mar- 
kets.“4 Furthermore, it may be argued that partners can obtain quotations 
from other Western firms in order to determine the going price for a 
Western input. 
The problem with this view is that one of the most common Western 
inputs is technical and managerial human capital, which is sufficiently 
project-specific and cost-hidden to leave enormous leeway in determining 
its market price. Moreover, price quotations for many other inputs are not 
easily obtainable or, since international competition between the trans- 
national corporations is limited, may carry little information value (see, 
for example, Barnet and Muller, 1974; Hymer, 1970, 1979). Thus, in our 
view a more realistic scenario is one where the parties bargain over the 
prices of some inputs supplied by both of them.5 
In order to make these concepts operational, we assume that the price 
vectors (V,, . . . , V,) and (W,, . . . , JV,), which the joint venture actually 
pays for the first k of the X inputs, (Xi, . . . , X,), and the first I of the Y 
inputs, (Y,, . . . , Y,), are subject to bargaining between the partners. The 
other input prices are not subject to bargaining and are equal to the costs 
of the respective inputs. In particular, for the remaining m - k inputs of 
X the prices paid by the joint venture are 6 = Ci (i = k + 1, . . . , m), 
while Wj = CT (j = 1 + 1, . . . , n) for the remaining n - 1 inputs of Y. 
Without loss of generality the price of labor, PL, is at present also assumed 
to be given parametrically. Usually, the host government contractually 
allows the Western partner to appropriate a fixed share s (0 I s I; 1) of 
the firm’s accounting profit, PQ - VX - WY - PLL. The Western partner 




where r is the total profit accruing to the Western partner, VX = 5 V& 
i=l 
’ Brada, 1977a. p. 170. 
5 This is consistent with much of the institutional literature on transnational corporations; 
all of our results carry over to the more restricted framework used by Brada (1977a). For a 
more detailed discussion, see Svejnar and Smith (1981) and Smith (1980). 
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n 
and WY = x W,Y> A similar objective function, ?r*, can also be constructed 
j=I 
for the domestic partner (firm or government), 
K* = 2 (Wj - C,*)q + (1 - S)(PQ - VX - IVY- PrL), (3) 
j=l 
where ?r* is the total profit accruing to the domestic partner. 
Objective functions (2) and (3) are perfectly analogous to the Romanian 
objective function postulated by Brada (1977a, p. 171) and the transideo- 
logical enterprise model employed by Brada (1977b, pp. 445-447). How- 
ever, while these functions are suitable maximands in the framework of 
joint decision making which we examine presently, they are not appropriate 
for analyzing the separate behavioral patterns of the two parties as was 
done by Brada in both of his papers. In particular, differentiating (3) with 
respect to Xi and Yj, Brada obtains the domestic partner’s first-order profit- 
maximizing conditions, which imply 
PQx, = vi , i= l,...,m, 
w.- cs 
PQq=Wj- ; -sJ 9 j= l,...,f, 
Wj 9 j=1+1 9 . * . 9 n, 
with QX, and Q, representing the partial derivatives of Q with respect to 
Xi and Yj, respectively. 
A similar exercise performed with respect to (2) generates the resource- 
allocation conditions desired by the Western partners: 
PQxi = Vi - 
Vi - Ci 
s ’ 
i= l,...,k, 
vi 3 i=k+ l,...,m, 
PQq = Wj 3 j=l 3 * * * 3 n. 
The two sets of conditions for factor allocation are clearly different and 
Brada (1977a,b) concludes that the partners will disagree on the appro- 
priate levels of inputs and output. Moreover, given that 6 > Ci (i = 1, 
. . . . k) and Wj > C7 (j = 1,. . . , I), Brada (1977a) asserts that the input 
decisions by both partners will be suboptimal. 
One problem with Brada’s approach is that one cannot derive results 
about the respective allocational criteria of the two partners on the basis 
of functions such as (2) or (3). To see this, take Eq. (3) as the maximand 
of the domestic partner with V and PL given parametrically. Unless s 
= 0, the domestic partner has an incentive to raise the prices of those in- 
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puts whose supply it controls, taking its profit in the form of higher input 
prices rather than as a share (1 - S) of declared profit. Assuming that the 
declared profit cannot be negative, PQ - VX - WY- PLL 2 0, the domestic 
partner obtains the highest profit for itself by maximizing PQ - VX 
- C*Y - PLL but “charging” the firm input prices Wj for Xj (j = 1, 
. . . , I) such that PQ - VX - WY - PLL = 0. In the extreme, if the 
declared profit were not institutionally bounded from below, the input prices 
Wj (j = 1, . . . , I) and hence the domestic partner’s profit (the Western 
partner’s loss) could be raised to infinity. These conclusions follow from 
the simple fact that for s > 0 the objective function (3) is homogeneous 
of a positive degree in Wj (j = 1, . . . , I) and Wj is presumed to be under 
the control of the domestic partners. Analogous reasoning applies with 
respect to (2), the objective function of the Western partner. 
The important point to be derived from these corrections of Brada’s 
approach is that, under the usual assumption of nonnegative net profit, PQ 
- VX - WY - P,L r 0, the profit maximizing behavior of the two parties, 
modeled in isolation, leads to the maximization of 
and 
i;=PQ-CX-WY-P,L (2’) 
it* = PQ- VX- C*Y- P,L, (3’) 
respectively, where (2’) is the maximand of the Western partner and (3’) 
the maximand of the host. The intuition behind (2’) and (3’) is as follows. 
As in (2) and (3), each party takes the prices over which it has no discretion 
as given. It then forms a profit function contingent on these prices and the 
cost of acquiring the inputs it supplies to the joint venture. The profit 
function i? [+*I measures the maximum profit that the Western partner 
[the host] can generate from the joint venture by setting vi (i = 1, . . . , 
k)[W,(j= 1,. . .) 1)] so that PQ - VX - WY- P,L = 0. The corresponding 
first-order conditions for a maximum imply 
PQx, = Ci 7 i= l,...,m, 
PQq = Wj 9 j=l 9 e s -3 n, 
PQL = PL 
in the case of a Western partner and 
PQx, = vi 7 i= l,...,m, 
PQy,= Cy, j=l ,..., n, 
PQL = PL 
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in the case of a domestic partner. As these conditions for factor allocation 
indicate, both partners, acting separately, would use the same marginal- 
product criteria (though not the same prices) for allocating resources. The 
points of disagreement (and hence bargaining) are thus the factor prices 
V(i= l,..., k) and W, (j = 1, . . . , I). 
While Eqs. (2’) and (3’) indicate that each partner wishes to maximize 
the net profit of the firm, the corresponding first-order conditions make it 
clear that in forming and operating the joint venture the partners must 
agree on the factor prices Vi (i = 1, . . . , k) and W, (i = 1, . . . , 1), which 
are subject to bargaining. In order to model both the allocational and 
distributional aspects of joint-venture behavior, it is therefore inadequate 
to consider the respective behavior of the two partners in isolation. Rather, 
it is necessary to use a model that captures the strategic interaction of the 
partners in maximizing and distributing the net profit of the firm. In this 
paper we employ a game-theoretic (bargaining) model that allows us to 
explain these aspects of joint-venture behavior. 
The Bargaining Model 
In analyzing the allocational and distributional issues of joint ventures 
we employ the variable-bargaining-power model developed by Svejnar 
(1977, 1982). The model generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining model 
by introducing explicitly the bargaining powers of the parties as deter- 
minants of the solution. While in the Nash (1950) model the two parties 
act as if maximizing the product of their utilities, 
Max U’ = UwUn , 
in the variable-bargaining-power model the parties act as if maximizing 
the weighted product of their utilities, 
Max U = UTUF, 
where Uw and UD are Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of the 
Western and domestic partner, respectively, yw is the bargaining power 
of the Western partner, and yn is the bargaining power of the domestic 
partner. Since only relative power matters it is convenient to normalize by 
settingy,=y(O<y< 1)andy n = 1 - y. The objective function can 
then be written as 
u = UY u(h) 
WD * (4) 
Using (4) as the objective function of the joint venture allows Pareto- 
efficient allocation of resources from the private point of view of the part- 
ners. Moreover, at the solution the two partners can be shown to divide 
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their joint net gain (in utility terms) in proportion to their bargaining 
powers as long as at least one input price can be bargained over. In terms 
of our earlier discussion the model thus allows for joint maximization of 
net profit and also provides a realistic distributional rule. 
3. MODELS OF SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS 
Table 1 summarizes the major institutional features of the six centrally 
planned and labor-managed economies that permit joint ventures.‘j While 
regulations have changed to blur the distinctions between the three country- 
cases studied by Brada, they remain valid as distinctive types of joint 
ventures and hence deserve separate study to see if their respective allo- 
cative and distributive criteria diverge. The existing systems depicted in 
the table conform analytically to the four major cases examined below. 
The ‘Romanian- Type” Model 
In view of the Romanian institutional system for joint ventures we as- 
sume that the objective functions of the two partners, Uw and Un, are 
reflected by Eqs. (2) and (3) of the previous section, respectively. Within 
the variable-bargaining-power framework the joint venture hence acts as 
if maximizing 
U = ?yy?r*(‘--y) = (2 (Vi - Ci)Xi 
+ s[PQ(X,, . . . , X,, . . . , X,, Y,, . . . , Y,, . . . , Y,,, L) 
+ (1 - s)[PQ(X,, . . . ,X,, . . . , X,,,, Y,, . . . , Y,, . . . , Y,,, /5) 
- 5 VJi - 5 Wjyj - PLL]}(‘-y). (4a) 
i=l j-l 
Taking X, Y, L, V, (i = 1, . . . , k), and W, (i = 1, . . . , 1) as the decision 
variables, the first-order conditions for a maximum lead to the following 
results:’ 
6 According to an embassy official, East Germany also permits joint ventures but so far none 
have been undertaken. More-over. only scanty information is available about their regulations. 
’ See the Appendix. 
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P&, = Ci 3 i= 1 3 * * * 9 My 
PQy, = Cj*, j= l,...,n, 
PQL = PL , 
A = y(PQ- CX- C*Y- PLL), 
?r* = (1 - y)(PQ - CX - C*Y - PLL). (5) 
The first three conditions in (5) determine the resource-allocation criteria 
of the joint venture. They indicate that the partners jointly allocate re- 
sources so that the marginal value product of each input equals the cor- 
responding per unit cost of the input. Hence, rather than using transfer 
prices 6 (i = 1, . . . , k) and Wj ( j = 1, . . . , I), where V, > Ci and Wj 
> C,*, the joint venture uses the actual acquisition costs of both the Eastern 
and the Western inputs in determining the optimal levels of input use. This 
result is important for two reasons: (a) it underscores the joint profit-max- 
imizing nature of the firm and (b) it indicates that the objective functions 
of the two partners given by (2) and (3) lead to socially efficient allocation 
of resources. The joint venture operating in a “Romanian-type” institu- 
tional system can thus be expected to be Pareto-efficient from the private 
point of view of the two partners as well as from the social vantage point. 
The last two conditions in (5) describe the distributional aspect of the 
joint venture. Having generated the largest possible net profit, PQ - CX 
- C*Y - PLL, the partners divide it in proportion to their bargaining 
powers, 
*/I? = Y/(1 - 7). (6) 
In harmony with the allocational criteria and the bargaining nature of the 
relationship, net profit is calculated as the revenues, PQ, minus the total 
factor cost evaluated at the actual supply costs of all inputs, CX + C*Y 
+ PLL. 
As the distributional rule in (6) indicates, the relative bargaining powers, 
y and 1 - y, are the sole determinants of the actual division of the net 
profit. This of course implies that the contractually set profit shares, s and 
1 - S, play no part in the distribution of the net profit between the two 
partners. While this result may at first seem surprising, it explains why 
one can observe transnational corporations entering into joint ventures 
under varying and often seemingly adverse conditions in terms of their 
contractual share of profit, s. The foregoing analysis shows that so long 
as the transnational corporation supplies inputs whose prices, Vi (i = 1, 
. . . , k), are subject to bargaining, its actual share of net profit is determined 
solely by its relative bargaining power, y, and its net profit share, ?r, is 
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collected through a combination of s(PQ - VX - WY - PJ) and 2 (Vi 
i=l 
- Ci)Xi. The same principle of course applies to the domestic partner. 
The “Hungarian Model” 
In the :‘Hungarian Model” of a joint venture, which was the only type 
permitted in Hungary from 1972 to 1977, the domestic partner produces 
Q under contract to the joint venture. The Western partner contributes the 
technology, convertible currency, and specialized inputs. The typical ven- 
ture then sells Q either domestically or abroad. 
Appealing to the existence of “at least partially functioning markets in 
Hungary and a meaningful exchange rate for the Hungarian forint,” Brada 
(1977a) simplifies the analysis by assuming that (a) the Hungarian partner 
supplies Q to the venture at a negotiated price P’, (b) there is a cost D(Q) 
associated with the distribution (sale) of Q by the venture, and (c) the 
Hungarian partner faces a cost function C(Q) in producing Q. In this 
framework the Western partner is presumably maximizing its share s of 
the profit given by 
?r = s[(P - P’)Q - D(Q)]. 
Provided D, > 0, the profit of the Western partner is maximized when 
P-P’=D,, (7) 
i.e., the constant per unit revenue (mark-up) equals the marginal cost of 
distributing Q. 
In contrast, the Hungarian partner’s objective function is 
a* = (1 - s)[(P - P’)Q - D(Q)] + P’Q - C(Q), 
which is maximized when 
(1 - s)(P - P’ - DQ) + P’ - C, = 0. (8) 
Brada (1977a) notes that (7) and (8) are identical only “if the transfer 
price P’ is set by negotiation at Co.” He also points out that if P’ Y’ C, 
there is a disagreement between the partners regarding the operation of 
the venture. 
In general there is no reason why P’ should be set equal to C’(Q). P’ 
is a parameter while C’(Q) is a variable whose value changes with the 
scale of operation. If anything, one might argue that the Hungarian firm 
adjusts Q so as to achieve C’(Q) = P’. However, Brada’s model is not 
formulated to produce this result and the outcome C’(Q) = P’ is purely 
coincidental. 
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Definite results can be obtained using the variable-bargaining-power 
model given by (4). In that framework the partners act as if maximizing 
U = uyu*(‘-*) = {s[(P - P’)Q - D(Q)]}y 
X ((1 - s)[(P - P’)Q - o(Q)] + P’Q - C(Q)}“-“. (4b) 
Taking Q and P’ as the decision variables, the first-order conditions cor- 
responding to this maximization problem lead to8 
P= C,+D,, 
u = dPQ - c(Q) - @Q>l, 
r* = (1 - r)[PQ - C(Q) - o(Q)]. (9) 
The first equation in (9) reflects the allocational criterion of the joint 
venture. Resources are allocated so that the sum of the marginal cost of 
production plus distribution, Cc + D,, equals the .parametrically given 
output price, P. This criterion of course makes sense as it generates max- 
imum profit for the joint venture. The equation also implies that if P’ 
= Co then P - P’ = D, as Brada (1977a) found in his model. However, 
the present model also indicates that there is no reason why P’ = C, or 
P - P’ = D,. P’ is an internal transfer price which is set so as to maximize 
the net profit of the joint venture and distribute it among the partners in 
proportion to y and (1 - y). As in the Romanian-type model, the distri- 
bution of the net profit is hence determined by the relative bargaining 
power, y and (1 - y), and Eq. (6) holds. The contractually set profit shares, 
s and (1 - s), again play no part in the distribution of the net profit. 
The 1977 Hungarian law on joint ventures introduced new elements into 
the relationship between the Western and domestic partners. The Western 
partners may now supply inputs and otherwise participate in the productive 
activities of the Hungarian joint ventures. Taking these legal innovations 
into account, the objective functions of the two partners may be specified 
as follows, beginning with the Western partner: 
u = 5 (Vi - Ci)Xi + s[(P - P’)Q - D(Q)], 
i-l 
U* = f: (Wj - C,*)Yj + (1 - s)[ (P - P’)Q - D(Q)] 
j=l 
+ P’Q- VX- WY- P,L. 
Both of these objective functions are again subject to the production func- 
* These and the following results are derived through the same procedure that generated 
the “Romanian Model” conditions in the Appendix. 
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tion given by (1). Within the variable-bargaining-power model the parties 
act as if maximizing 
u = UYU*(‘-~) = {i (Vi - Ci)Xi + s[(P - P’)Q - D(Q)]}’ 
X {,z (wj - WY, + (1 - s)[U' - P')Q - o(Q)1 
+ P’Q - V-X - WY - PLL}(‘--y), (4~) 
subject to (1). With Vi (i = 1, . . . , k), P’, Wi (j = 1, . . . , I), X, Y, and 
L being the decision variables, the first-order conditions for a maximum 
lead to the following results: 
(P - DQ)Q.x~ = Ci 3 i= l,...,m, 
(P - DQ)QY, = Cj 9 j= l,...,n, 
(P - &)QL = PL , 
A = y[PQ - CX - C*Y - PLL - D(Q)], 
u* = (1 - r)[PQ - CX - C*Y - PLL - D(Q)]. (9’) 
An examination of these conditions reveals that, apart from the terms D(Q) 
and De, the allocational and distributional conditions in this “revised Hun- 
garian model” are identical with those in the “Romanian-type model.” 
Should distribution costs, D(Q), be explicitly taken into account in the 
“Romanian-type model” the results would be identical. Consequently, there 
is no reason to distinguish the two models in terms of criteria for factor 
allocation and income distribution. 
The “Yugoslav Model” 
The Yugoslav system of workers’ self-management generates a new ob- 
jective function for the domestic (Yugoslav) partner. Following the models 
of Ward (1958), Domar (1966), and Vanek (1970), Brada (1977a) assumes 
that the Yugoslav worker-managers will maximize the income per worker, 
where relevant workers are those remaining with the firm after the optimum 
resource allocation has been reached. Utilizing his Romanian-type objective 
function for the Western partner, Brada (1977a) shows that, as in the 
Romanian model, the Western partner wishes to allocate resources so that 
for each input the value of marginal product equals the parametrically 
given input price. The Yugoslav worker-managers have the same criterion 
for the nonlabor inputs. However, as in the Ward-Domar-Vanek model, 
the worker-managers wish to equate the marginal value product of labor 
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to the actual income per worker. Formally, the Western partner’s objective 
function 
?r=s(PQ-VX-WY-PLL) 
gives rise to the following resource-allocation conditions: 
PQx, = vi 3 i= l,...,m, 
PQY, = W, , j= l,...,n, 
PQL = PL . 
The Yugoslav worker-managers maximize 
?r* = PL + +PQ- VX- WY- PLL) 
and they wish to allocate resources according to the following criteria: 
PQx, = vi , i= l,...,m, 
PQyj = W, 3 j= l,...,n, 
PQL = PL + (PQ - VX - WY - P,L)/L. 
Brada (1977a) points out that if profit is positive, PQ - VX - WY 
- PLL > 0, the two partners disagree on the criterion for the utilization 
of labor, and, assuming that marginal products of other inputs are functions 
of the volume of labor employed, the two partners in fact disagree on the 
actual utilization of all inputs. 
There is another source of conflict arising between the two partners, 
namely the division of workers’ incomes into wages, PL, and the profit 
share, (1 - s)(PQ - VX - WY - P,L)/L. While in his formal exposition 
Brada (1977a) treats PL as given, he argues correctly that if PL is increased 
by one dinar the Yugoslav workers gain s dinars at the expense of the 
foreign partner. Since this is a crucial aspect of the joint venture which 
is not found in the standard Ward-Domar-Vanek model of a labor-man- 
aged firm, it is worthwhile to explore this aspect of the joint venture more 
formally. 
Realizing the problems inherent in examining the objectives of the two 
partners in isolation, we model the Yugoslav-type joint venture within the 
variable-bargaining-power model. We use the more general framework in 
which the objective function of the Western partner is 
s=~(V,-C,)X~+S(PQ-VX-WY-P,L), 
i=l 
while the Yugoslav worker-managers maximize 
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U* = i [,i (Wj - Cy)q + (1 - s)(PQ - VX - WY - PLL)], 
where PL is taken as the threat point of a typical worker. The partners 
then behave as if jointly maximizing 
u = UYU*(‘-‘) = 1; ( Vi - Ci)Xi + s(PQ - VX - WY - PLL)}’ 
x {(l/L)[,z (Wj- Cf)q + (1 - s)(PQ- VX- WY- P~L)]}“-r’* 
(44 
The first-order conditions for a maximum yield the following results: 
PQx, = Ci, i= l,...,m, 






T(PQ- VX- WY - PLL), 
u = y(PQ - CX - C*Y - P,L), 
?r* = (1 - 7)[(PQ - CX - C*Y - P,L)/L]. (10) 
It is also easy to show that if, as in Brada’s formulation, the prices of 
all the nonlabor inputs are given, Wi = Cf (i = 1, . . . , n) and Vi = Ci 
(i = 1, . . . , m), then 
PQxi = Vi = Cl ) i= l,...,M, 
PQq= Wj= C,t, j= l,...,n, 
PQL = PL + +PQ- VX- WY-P,), 
u = 7(PQ- VX- WY- P,L), 
u* = (1 - y)(PQ - VX - WY - PLL)/L. t1w 
The first three conditions in (10) and ( 10’) determine the factor allocation 
of the joint venture. These conditions indicate that the venture adopts the 
resource-allocation criteria of the Yugoslav partner. Resources are allo- 
cated so that the marginal value products of all nonlabor inputs are equated 
to the per unit acquisition costs of these inputs. In this respect the Yugoslav 
joint ventures behave like their Romanian or Hungarian counterparts. 
The crucial distinction between the joint ventures in Yugoslavia and in 
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the other countries arises from the condition governing the allocation of 
labor. As the third condition in (10) and (10’) demonstrates, Yugoslav- 
type joint ventures equate the marginal value product of labor to the actual 
income per worker, PL + a*. Unless PL + r* accidentally happens to equal 
the economy-wide full-employment income per worker, the actual alloca- 
tion of resources by any given joint venture is Pareto-inefficient from the 
social point of view. Qualitatively, this result corresponds to that obtained 
for a Ward-Domar-Vanek-type labor-managed firm. However, as the last 
two conditions in (10) and (10’) indicate, the Yugoslav joint ventures be- 
have differently from their domestic labor-managed counterparts in terms 
of their criteria for income distribution and hence also in terms of their 
actual resource allocation. In particular, the domestic labor-managed firms 
do not share their net profit with a foreign partner, y = 0, and hence are 
likely to generate different income per worker.g Differences in the actual 
income per worker imply different allocation of all inputs provided the 
production function is not additively separable. Under complete separa- 
bility differences exist merely with respect to allocation of labor; and, as- 
suming identical technology, firms with the highest income per worker will 
use the least of the labor input. 
As our analysis indicates, the joint ventures use the same criteria as the 
domestic labor-managed firms for factor allocation but, due to differences 
in the distribution (and possibly the level) of net profit, they are likely to 
differ in terms of actual resource allocation. Moreover, while both types 
of firms behave Pareto-efficiently from their private point of view, they are 
Pareto-inefficient from the social vantage point whenever the net profit is 
positive. 
An Alternative Labor-Management Model 
The “Yugoslav Model” presented in the preceding section generates 
conclusions that are similar to those of the Ward-Domar-Vanek model 
of a labor-managed firm. Unfortunately, the two models also share the 
same unrealistic features that have been criticized by many researchers, 
including Robinson (1967) and Vanek ( 1970). In particular, the models 
assume that a self-managed collective of t workers, who wish to remain 
with the firm, does not maximize an objective function such as income 
pertaining to these L workers. Instead, the models assume that the given 
group of L workers will adjust employment (and if necessary lay off some 
of its worker-members) so that the income of the workers who remain with 
the firm (say, L) is maximized. 
No institutional justification is usually provided to motivate this behav- 
9 Of course, differences in income per worker may also exist if the joint ventures use tech- 
nologies and inputs different from those used in the domestic labor-managed firms. 
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ior. It is, therefore, not clear why any given group of L workers would 
agree to an involuntary lay-off of E - L of its members, how this adjustment 
in employment is carried out, what status the laid-off workers retain, and 
what compensation these workers receive. In the absence of (i) a plausible 
institutional justification for the maximand of the Ward-Domar-Vanek 
model, or (ii) sufficient empirical evidence supporting the model, it is pos- 
sible that labor-managed firms in fact follow other objectives. Indeed, three 
alternative models of a labor-managed firm have recently been advanced 
by Sapir ( 1980), Miyazaki and Neary ( 1979) and Svejnar (1982), re- 
spectively. Each of these models could be used as a basis for analyzing 
joint-venture behavior in a labor-managed economy. Because of the limited 
scope of this paper, we merely adapt Svejnar’s (1982) model to the case 
of joint ventures and briefly examine the underlying criteria for resource 
allocation and income distribution. 
The model assumes that while the Western partner again maximizes 
?F = ~ (Vi - Ci)Xi + s(PQ - OX - WY - P,L), 
i=l 
the worker-managers maximize the expected income of the L worker-mem- 
bers. In this institutional framework the L workers strive to maximize their 
total (or average) labor income from all available sources and allocate their 
resources accordingly. The framework is compatible with various forms of 
income distribution (transfers) between the L workers who are at any given 
time selected to work in the firm and the L - L workers who at that time 
either work elsewhere or consume leisure. 
Formally, a typical worker-member faces the probability L/E of being 
employed in the given firm and earning 
PL + ?r* = PL + ; [i ( Wj - C,*)yi + (1 - s)(PQ - VX - WY - P,L)], 
J 1 
as well as the probability 1 - (L/L) of not working with the firm and 
earning PL. lo The expected income that is being maximized by the worker- 
managers is hence given by 
(PL+ 7r*)g+ PL 1-i . 
( ) 
Taking PL as the worker threat point, the two parties within the variable- 
bargaining-power model then act as if maximizing 
” It is assumed here that PL is the (best alternative) market wage or the mean of a dis- 
tribution of the available alternative wages. 
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X {; [ $ (Wj - C,*)yj + (1 - s)(PQ - VX - WY - P&] j(l-“. (de) 
J 1 
The first-order conditions for a maximum corresponding to (4e) yield 
PQx~ = Ci 9 i= l,...,m, 
PQY, = Cj+, j= l,...,n, 
PQL = PL , 
T = y(PQ - CX - C*Y - P,L), 
?r** = (1 - r)(PQ - CX - C*Y - P,L)/E, (11) 
where ?r** is labor’s share of net profit divided by L. As these conditions 
indicate, the joint ventures in the present model allocate resources in a 
socially Pareto-efficient way. All resources are hired to the point where 
their marginal value products equal their acquisition (market) prices. The 
two partners again split the net profit in proportion to their bargaining 
powers and contractual profit shares, s and (1 - s), are ineffective. 
The important aspect of this model is the independence of the allocative 
and distributive criteria. Although all decisions are made simultaneously, 
one may think of the bargaining process as being divided into two stages. 
First, the partners allocate resources in a privately as well as socially op- 
timal way. Second, they divide the net profit in proportion to their bar- 
gaining powers. The separation of the allocative and distributive issues 
implies that in terms of resource allocation the joint venture and the do- 
mestic labor-managed firms are identical so long as they share the same 
technology, inputs, and market conditions. 
The theoretical predictions obtained from the two models of Yugoslav- 
type joint ventures are substantially different both from the academic and 
the policy point of view. The next logical area of research is clearly to test 
which model is better supported empirically. 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis highlights two relevant policy areas. One is the social ef- 
ficiency of resource allocation in joint ventures. The other is the bargaining 
process and the relative bargaining powers of the parties. 
The issue of social efficiency arises only with respect to participatory or 
labor-managed joint ventures in which the labor-managed partner repre- 
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sents the relatively narrow and changing constituency of workers remaining 
with the enterprise once the firm reaches a given equilibrium position.” 
In the expected income-maximizing participatory scheme as well as in all 
the other cases examined in this paper, the ventures allocate resources 
Pareto-efficiently from the host country’s social point of view. Since many 
governments consider the introduction of worker participation or self-man- 
agement, the efficiency implications of the two types of systems ought to 
be carefully weighed. It must also be remembered that inefficiency arises 
in the first type of participatory and self-managed firms only when the net 
profit and labor’s bargaining power are positive. The actual industrial struc- 
ture and the relative strength of the partners are thus relevant factors to 
be considered in formulating the appropriate policies. 
The existing evidence indicates that the distributional issues are among 
the major ones arising between the two partners. In forming a joint venture 
each party tries to create institutions and bargaining processes that it re- 
gards as most advantageous for itself. In other words, in the situation of 
a constant-sum game each party attempts to position itself so as to max- 
imize its relative bargaining power. 
Given the institutional frameworks surveyed in this paper, there are 
several options open to each party. In simple terms, there are two stages 
during which the conflict issues can be resolved. The first stage covers the 
negotiation of the formal contract while the second one spans the operation 
of the venture while the formal contract is in force. Some observers contend 
that all major issues, including the distribution of net profit, can be resolved 
in the first stage. For example, Dymsza ( 1972, p. 211) argues that joint- 
venture contracts “can deal with possible conflict areas, such as election 
of the board of directors, management selection and remuneration, the 
determination of financial structure, payment for central administrative 
services, management and technology, and distribution of profits.” There 
is no doubt that the more clearly specified the contract, the less room there 
is for bargaining in the second stage. At the same time, a realistic approach 
must recognize that imperfect foresight and changing market (as well 
as other) conditions make the complete specification of an efficient contract 
impossible. As Hall and Lilien (1979, p. 870) pointed out in their recent 
study of efficient wage bargains, “neither party to a collective-bargaining 
agreement has full knowledge of the economic circumstances that will 
prevail during the agreement. Both the demand for products and the op- 
portunity cost of labor can change unexpectedly. Framers of agreements 
must anticipate the possible need to adjust the level of employment as 
” It must be noted that the conclusions regarding social optimality are unambiguously valid 
only if one assumes that the cost of inputs, C, C*, and PL, as well as the product price, P, 
correspond to prices that would generate Pareto-efficient resource allocation in the economy. 
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supply and demand change.” Combining the uncertainty of the parties with 
Leontief’s (1946) classic result that both prices and quantities need to be 
fully specified by the bargainers if the bargain is to be efficient from their 
private point of view, one can readily see that bargaining is likely to take 
place in both stages. 
The two-stage negotiation process has important implications for bar- 
gaining outcomes within the institutional systems examined in this paper. 
The “Eastern” partner may be represented by the government, a domestic 
firm or both. In many situations the host government (usually the finance 
ministry) provides a significant input into the negotiation of the formal 
contract while the domestic firm is the primary negotiator in the second 
stage. The government negotiators are usually more experienced, enjoy 
access to better information, and command superior bargaining skills and 
expertise than the negotiators of a domestic firm. This disparity is likely 
to be reflected in the strategic behavior of a rational foreign partner. The 
resulting distribution of the net profit will be proportional to the relative 
bargaining powers of the foreign partner and the domestic firm, y/( 1 
- y), even if the initial contract reflects the relative bargaining powers of 
the foreign partner and the host government, s/( 1 - s). To the extent that 
the host government supplies its firms with better market information and 
bargaining expertise during the joint-venture operations, the actual bar- 
gaining power of the domestic partner may in fact be enhanced vis a vis 
the foreign counterpart. Finally, since the results are perfectly symmetric, 
they apply to the foreign firms as well, provided these firms use different 
negotiators in the two stages of joint-venture bargaining. 
APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS FOR THE 
ROMANIAN MODEL 
The firm acts us if maximizing the function 
where 
u = 1r71r*(1--1) 9 (Al) 
T= i: (Vi-Ci)Xi 
i=I 
i-l i=k+l j=l j=l+ I 
K* = C (Wj - Cf)q 
j-l 
+(I-S)(PQ-2 VJi- 2 CjXi-iI Wjyi- i: C,*yi-PLL), 
i=l i=k+l j=l j=l+l 
Q = Q(x,, . . . , x,, . . . , x,,,, Y,, . . . , 6, . . . , Y,,, L). 
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For simplicity of differentiation, (Al) can be expressed in natural loga- 
rithms as 
ri = y In 7r + (1 - y) In IT*. (Al’) 
The first-order conditions corresponding to (Al’) are 
^ 




g = 7 (P&i - Ci) + (’ - y,‘!’ - ‘) (PQ,, - Ci) = 0, 
1 
(AZ) 
i= k+ l,...,m, (A3) ^ 
g.=F(PQq-Wj)+y [ Wj - CT + ( 1 - s)(PQ~ - Wj)] = 0, 
J 
j= l,...,l, ^ 
au=rs(pQ~-Cf)+(l-;!l -)(pQ+-f)=o, aq ?r 
644) 
j=r+l n, , . * * 7 
^ 




~~~(xi-~xi)-(l-~l;l--s)xi=o, i= l,...,k, (A7) I 
n- Y j-c- 
?r* 1-y’ 
au -=- -YE;+i!I$d 
aWi ?r 
[yi - (1 - s)yi] = 0, j= l,...,I, 648) 
7r Y a--=- 
?r* 1-y’ 
Combining (A2), (A3), and (A7) yields 
PQx, = Ci 9 i= l,...,m, 
which is the first condition in (5) of the main text. Conditions (A4), (A5), 
and (A7) lead to 
PQY, = CT, j= I,...,n, 
which is the second condition in (5). Finally conditions (A6) and (A7) 
result in the criterion for the allocation of labor in (5): 
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PQL = PL . 
From the equations for ?r and r* it is possible to express ?r* as 
s*=i(Wj-Cf)Y;+PQ-5 VJi-,=i,CJi-iWj, 
j=l i-l j=l 
or 
#=PQ-CX-C*Y-PLL--?r. 
Upon substitution from (A7) this expression yields the distributional con- 
ditions in (5): 
?r = 7(PQ- CX- C*Y- P,L), 
?r*=(l-y)(PQ-CX-C*Y-PLL). 
The strict concavity of the production function guarantees that the first- 
order conditions correspond to a maximum. 
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